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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Keith Younge is an African-American man who was 
fired by WPHL, a Philadelphia television station owned by 
Tribune Media Company (“Tribune”).  He claims the station 
subjected him to a hostile work environment because it 
scheduled him to train under a white co-worker who accosted 
him with racial epithets.  He further contends he was 
wrongfully terminated because of his race and/or color. 
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 Although Younge filed a complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Human Relations, he chose to 
litigate his claims in Bankruptcy Court after Tribune filed a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.  When it disallowed his 
claims, Younge appealed to the District Court.  There he 
challenged for the first time the Bankruptcy Court’s 
jurisdiction to hear his claims.  The District Court held he 
impliedly consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction.  It 
also concluded the Bankruptcy Court correctly disallowed his 
hostile work environment and wrongful termination claims.  
Because we agree, we affirm.   
I. Background matters 
 A. Factual background 
 In April 2008, Younge was hired as a seasonal, part-
time technician by WPHL.  He was trained by full-time 
technicians, as he was responsible for covering their vacation 
schedules between Memorial Day and Labor Day.  On May 7, 
2008, Younge was scheduled to train with Rick Schultz, an 
engineering technician.  Before Younge’s training began, 
Sandy Kerr, a technician, told him, “If you run into any trouble 
tonight[,] make sure you tell me tomorrow.”  In re Tribune 
Media Co., Case No. 08–13141(KJC), 2016 WL 1122865, at 
*2 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 18, 2016) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  When he asked Steve Leff, another technician, to 
explain Kerr’s statement, Leff said, “Schultz has a problem.”  
Id.  When Younge inquired whether Schultz had a problem 
with him, Leff replied, “No, he just has a problem.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 During his training with Schultz, Younge walked into 
the room and placed his briefcase on the table.  Schultz 
immediately responded, “Hey Spike, you want to get this off 
the table?”  App. at 127a (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Assuming Schultz did not know his name, Younge introduced 
himself.  The former answered, “[A]s far as [I] am concern[ed,] 
you are Spike Lee.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Younge walked over to Schultz and retorted, “I told you what 
my name is,” and Schultz countered, “I’ll call you anything I 
want to.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Younge, in 
an attempt to diffuse the situation, stated, “[W]hoa, I don’t 
know what’s going on here[.]  [A]ll you have to do is train me.”  
Id. at 157a (internal quotation marks omitted).  Schultz replied, 
“I don’t work for you, I don’t have to listen to you, I don’t have 
to train you, some intern.”  Id.  When Younge told him he was 
not an intern and had been in the television industry for years, 
Schultz asked, “Well[,] why don’t you know nothing?”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Schultz walked into the adjacent room, and Younge 
followed him.  The argument continued, with both parties 
yelling and using profanity.  At one point, Schultz told Younge 
to “take that shit back to the ghetto[,] hommie.”  Id. at 127a 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Younge also said, “Hey 
motherfucker, use my name[;] motherfucker[,] I dare you to hit 
me.”  Id. at 160a (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Eventually, the station’s security officer entered the room and 
physically separated both men.  Ed Elias, the technician-in-
charge, called the station and spoke with Younge.  He told him 
to go home and assured him that the station would investigate 
the incident in the morning. 
 The next day, Younge called Elias and Michael Hort, a 
supervisor.  After hearing Younge’s account of the altercation, 
one of them said, “[Y]ou should have never had to deal with 
that—we have had problems with S[c]hultz before.”  Id. at 74a 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  On May 12, 2008, Shalona 
Douglas, a human resources coordinator, called Younge to 
investigate the incident.  She asked him whether he cursed at 
Schultz.  Younge responded that he did.  Douglas probed 
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further, inquiring whether Younge remembered what he said.  
He answered, “[N]o, I was angry[.]  I don’t remember.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, she asked if 
Younge had spit on Schultz.  He replied, “[A]bsolutely not.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Douglas also spoke 
with Schultz and other technicians, including Leff.  The latter 
informed her that Schultz made a number of comments 
immediately before training Younge.  For example, Schultz 
told other technicians that Younge “look[ed] like Spike Lee,” 
id. at 162a (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Douglas submitted her findings to Vincent Giannini, 
WPHL’s Vice President and General Manager.  After 
reviewing them, he concluded both Younge and Schultz should 
be discharged for violating WPHL’s Code of Conduct and 
Anti-Harassment Policy.  The station sent termination letters 
to both men on May 15, 2008.   
 B. Procedural background 
 Younge filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania 
Commission on Human Relations in June 2008 alleging he was 
subjected to a hostile work environment and wrongfully 
terminated because of his race and/or color.  He forwarded a 
copy of his complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, which notified him that it would not act on his 
complaint until its Pennsylvania counterpart issued final 
findings and orders.  Younge’s claims were based on Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 951 et seq.; and the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance, 
Phila., Pa., Code ch. 9-1100 et seq.   
 The Pennsylvania Commission on Human Relations 
began investigating the complaint during the same month.  It 
started by gathering evidence from WPHL and Schultz.  The 
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former responded to the agency’s questions and provided 
company records as requested.  Schultz also spoke with the 
Commission.  He said that on, May 6, 2008 (i.e., the day before 
he trained Younge), he asked Leff, “[W]hy are you training a 
hoop . . . who doesn’t know anything?”  App. at 159a (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  He also admitted he gave Younge a 
nickname—“Spike Lee”—and acknowledged his own 
nickname was the “Nazi.”  Id. at 163a.  Schultz, however, never 
mentioned whether WPHL’s management knew of his 
nickname before his altercation with Younge.   
 In December 2008, when the Commission’s 
investigation was still ongoing, Tribune and its affiliates 
(including WPHL) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (for 
simplicity, we refer to all debtors as “Tribune”).  Younge 
responded by filing a proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Court.1  
Tribune objected to it.  Because Younge was not represented 
by counsel at the time, he filed a pro se response to Tribune’s 
objection.  When he obtained counsel, the Bankruptcy Court 
held a hearing on the claim and allowed Younge’s counsel to 
file a supplemental response that included additional evidence.  
Tribune, in turn, filed a supplemental reply.  After the parties 
completed briefing, the Court notified them that it was 
reviewing Tribune’s objection, see id. at 59a (docket entry 
stating “Judge Carey is reviewing this case”), and construed it 
as a motion for summary judgment.  
                                              
1 Because Younge opted to litigate in Bankruptcy Court, 
his proceedings before the Pennsylvania Commission on 
Human Relations were automatically stayed.  He did not file a 
motion for relief from the automatic stay to allow the 
investigation to continue.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (stating 
administrative actions that predate any proceedings under Title 
11 are automatically stayed).   
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 The Court sustained the objection.  It held Younge 
could not establish a hostile work environment claim because 
he could not prove respondeat superior liability (i.e., that 
WPHL was liable for Schultz’s discriminatory behavior 
because it knew of Schultz’s racial animus and failed to take 
prompt remedial action).  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
considered Schultz’s personnel file and employment history.  It 
noted Schultz had been employed at WPHL since 1972 and had 
been involved in two other altercations with his co-workers.  
The first altercation involved accusations of racial bias and 
occurred in 1993.  A security guard was angry that Schultz 
accidentally tripped a door alarm and accused him of making a 
racist comment.  Schultz, however, denied any type of racial 
animus, and the letter in his personnel file included his take of 
the incident.  While the second altercation did not contain any 
allegations of racism, it involved profanity and took place in 
2002.  In view of this evidence, the Court acknowledged it was 
“troubl[ed]” by the incident from 1993.  In re Tribune Media 
Co., 2016 WL 1122865, at *6.  Nonetheless it concluded that 
a single altercation from 1993 did not “provide[] the [s]tation 
with notice or reason to know that Schultz would create a 
hostile work environment” or “harass Younge with racial slurs 
in May 2008.”  Id. at *6-7.  
 Turning to the wrongful termination claim, the 
Bankruptcy Court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (noting that, after a plaintiff-
employee proves a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
employer must offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for its action and the plaintiff may rebut this reason by showing 
that it is pretextual).  It observed that WPHL provided a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Younge 
because it discharged him for violating the station’s Code of 
Conduct and Anti-Harassment Policy.  It concluded Younge 
failed to show that the station’s reasons were pretextual 
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because he admitted he engaged in conduct that was prohibited 
by WPHL’s employment policies.  Though Younge pointed to 
WPHL’s favorable treatment of Schultz following his 2002 
altercation as evidence of pretext (he only received a written 
warning), the Bankruptcy Court rejected that argument.  It 
noted Younge provided “no evidence that the [2002 and 2008 
incidents] were of comparable seriousness.”  In re Tribune 
Media Co., 2016 WL 1122865, at *11.  In the Court’s view, 
“the best comparator for Younge’s [discharge] [was] the 
[s]tation’s treatment of Schultz, who participated in the same 
incident[,] was investigated at the same time by the same 
people . . . [, and] received the same treatment.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the Court concluded Younge was not wrongfully 
terminated because of his race and/or color and disallowed his 
claim in its entirety. 
 Younge appealed to the District Court.  He contested the 
Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction for the first time and argued 
its proceedings violated his due process rights and his Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  He also challenged the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision as to his hostile work 
environment and wrongful termination claims.  The District 
Court observed that Younge never raised the issue of 
jurisdiction during bankruptcy proceedings.  Instead, he 
litigated his claim to a final judgment, filing two responses to 
Tribune’s claim objection, appearing at a hearing, and 
acknowledging that the Court would “fully evaluate [his] 
claim.”  In re Tribune Media Co., C.A. No. 16-226 (GMS), 
2017 WL 2622743, at *5 (D. Del. June 16, 2017) (alteration 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting App. at 
212a).  In light of these actions, the Court held that Younge 
waived any objection to adjudication in Bankruptcy Court and 
impliedly consented to its jurisdiction.  The District Court also 
held that the Bankruptcy Court did not violate Younge’s due 
process rights, as it gave him ample opportunities to submit 
additional evidence, and it did not violate his Seventh 
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Amendment right to a jury trial by disallowing his claim.  
Finally, the District Court affirmed the rulings on Younge’s 
hostile work environment and wrongful termination claims, 
providing the same reasons as those in the Bankruptcy Court’s 
opinion.  This appeal followed.  
II. Standard of Review 
  “Our review of the District Court’s order on [the 
Bankruptcy Court’s] jurisdiction is de novo.”  In re Resorts 
Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2004).  We also 
“review de novo the bankruptcy court’s order granting 
summary judgment.”  In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 
1995).  It is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute exists “if the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  “[A] party will not be able to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment merely by making 
allegations.”  In re Ikon Office Sols., Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 
(3d Cir. 2002).  Instead, the nonmoving party must “designate 
specific facts” in the record to “show[] that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
III. Discussion  
A. The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over 
Younge’s claims. 
A bankruptcy court must have statutory authority and 
constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a claim.  
See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482 (2011); see also In re 
Galaz, 765 F.3d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(“A bankruptcy court may enter final judgment only if . . . [it] 
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has both statutory and constitutional authority to do so.”).  
Younge contends the Bankruptcy Court lacked both types of 
authority to adjudicate his claims.  Tribune counters that 
Younge’s claims fall within the Court’s statutory authority.  It 
also claims he forfeited any objection to the Court’s 
constitutional authority to decide his claims.  We address the 
parties’ arguments in turn. 
1. Younge consented to the Bankruptcy 
Court’s statutory authority to decide 
his claims.   
 “A bankruptcy court’s statutory authority [to decide a 
claim] derives from 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), which designates 
certain matters as ‘core proceedings’ . . . .”  In re Galaz, 765 
F.3d at 431.  A bankruptcy court has the constitutional 
authority to enter a final judgment on core proceedings, and, if 
a claimant appeals, the district court reviews the bankruptcy 
court’s judgment “under traditional appellate standards.”  
Stern, 564 U.S. at 475.  The statutory scheme gives several 
examples of core proceedings, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), but 
explicitly excludes “the liquidation or estimation of contingent 
or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims,” 
id. § 157(b)(2)(B).  It specifies that these claims “shall be tried 
in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending . . . 
or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose.”  
Id. § 157(b)(5).   
 Relying on these provisions, Younge asserts the 
Bankruptcy Court lacked statutory authority to decide his 
claims because they fall under the exception for personal injury 
tort claims.  Tribune responds that the Bankruptcy Court had 
“the authority to disallow a personal injury tort claim” that 
“fails as a matter of law.”  Tribune Br. at 24-25 (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted).  It further contends the exception in 
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§ 157(b)(2)(B) is only implicated when it is necessary to 
determine the dollar amount of a claim.  
 “The term ‘personal injury tort claim’ is not expressly 
defined in Title 28 or Title 11.”  In re Arnold, 407 B.R. 849, 
851 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2009).  Bankruptcy courts have adopted 
different definitions of the term, see id. at 851-53, and only a 
subset have categorized civil rights claims as “personal injury 
tort claims,” see id. at 852.2  Here, however, we need not decide 
whether Younge’s claims are personal injury tort claims 
because he consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s statutory 
authority.  As the Supreme Court has explained, a party may 
forfeit or waive any objections to § 157(b)(5) because that 
provision is not jurisdictional.  See Stern, 564 U.S. at 479-80.  
A claimant waives an objection under § 157(b)(5) when he 
“implicate[s] the jurisdiction of th[e] bankruptcy court[,] . . . 
[chooses] to be a party to that litigation,” and thus “consent[s] 
to that court’s resolution of his . . . claim[s]. . . .”  Id. at 481 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
Consistent with these principles, Younge voluntarily 
submitted to a decision by the Bankruptcy Court, as he filed a 
proof of claim, filed a response to Tribune’s objection, filed a 
supplemental response, and appeared at a hearing before that 
Court.  Although his proof of claim and initial response were 
                                              
2 Bankruptcy courts also disagree on whether they may 
disallow personal injury tort claims under § 157(b)(2).  See In 
re Dow Corning Corp., 215 B.R. 346, 349-51 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1997).  We express no view on this issue and, as noted, 
focus our analysis on consent and waiver.  See Stern, 564 U.S. 
at 479-82 (declining to construe the personal-injury-tort-claim 
exception because the respondent consented to the bankruptcy 
court’s resolution of his claims, thus waiving any statutory 
objection to the contrary).  
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pro se, neither his counseled filing (e.g., his supplemental 
response) nor his counsel’s statements to the Court included 
any type of objection to the Court’s statutory authority.  
Instead, his counsel acknowledged the Bankruptcy Court 
would “evaluate [his] claim[s]” and pointed to evidence that 
would assist the Court in ruling in his favor.  App. at 212a.  In 
this context, we conclude that Younge consented to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s resolution of his claims and waived any 
argument to the contrary.    
 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court had statutory 
authority to decide his claims. 
2. The Bankruptcy Court had 
constitutional authority to enter a final 
judgment on Younge’s claims because 
he knowingly and voluntarily 
consented to its jurisdiction.   
 Younge also challenges the Bankruptcy Court’s 
constitutional authority to decide his claims.  He contends the 
Court was required to obtain his express consent before 
deciding his claim.  See Younge Br. at 24 (arguing Younge 
never affirmatively consented to litigate his claim in 
bankruptcy court).  Because it failed to do so, he claims it 
lacked constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on the 
merits.  
 We disagree.  No court has stated that a litigant must 
expressly consent to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.  See 
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1948 
n.13 (2015) (“[T]he Constitution does not require that consent 
be express. . . .”).  While the Supreme Court has held that a 
litigant must “knowingly and voluntarily consent” to 
jurisdiction, id. at 1939, it has also stated that consent may be 
“express or implied,” id. at 1948.  The Court explained that a 
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party may impliedly consent through his “actions rather than 
[his] words,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 589-90 (2003)), and that a 
litigant’s consent gives bankruptcy courts the constitutional 
authority to enter a final judgment on claims that ordinarily 
require a ruling by an Article III court,3 see id. at 1939. 
In the wake of Wellness, several courts have opined on 
what actions (and omissions) amount to implied consent.  Most 
prominently, the Fifth Circuit has held a party impliedly 
consents to bankruptcy jurisdiction when he “raise[s] no 
constitutional objection when joining the case.”  Matter of 
Delta Produce, L.P., 845 F.3d 609, 617 (5th Cir. 2016).  
District courts have echoed this conclusion, stating a litigant 
impliedly consents to jurisdiction by appearing before the 
bankruptcy court “without [any] objection.”  Cole v. Strauss, 
No. 2:16-cv-04143-NKL, 2017 WL 26906, at *9 (W.D. Mo. 
Jan. 3, 2017), aff’d, 732 F. App’x 497 (8th Cir. 2018) (per 
curiam); see also Mandel v. Jones, Civil Action No. 4:12-cv-
                                              
3 Article III, § 1, of the Constitution states that “[t]he 
judicial Power of the United States . . . shall be vested in one 
supreme Court . . . and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish.”  U.S. Const. art 
III, § 1.  “Congress has . . . established 94 District Courts and 
13 Courts of Appeals, composed of judges who enjoy the 
protections of Article III: life tenure and pay that cannot be 
diminished.”  Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1938.  At the same time, 
however, “Congress has . . . authorized the appointment of 
bankruptcy and magistrate judges, who do not enjoy the 
protections of Article III, to assist Article III courts in their 
work.”  Id.  Though the service of bankruptcy and magistrate 
judges is no doubt of great value to the federal court system, 
see id. at 1939 & n.2, they are not constitutionally authorized 
to enter a final judgment in every case.  
14 
 
87, 2016 WL 4943366, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2016) 
(“Parties may impliedly consent to trial of a debtor’s state-law 
counterclaim when a bankruptcy judge hears evidence and 
testimony related to that claim without the parties’ 
objections.”); True Traditions, LC v. Wu, 552 B.R. 826, 838 
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (“When it came time for summary judgment 
. . . , Appellant sought final judgment in its favor without ever 
mentioning consent. . . .  The unmistakable implication from 
Appellant’s motion is that it sought an entry of final judgment 
in its favor. . . .  Courts confronted with this situation have time 
and again concluded that the movant had impliedly consented 
to the bankruptcy court’s authority to enter final judgment.” 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).   
In reaching their respective holdings, courts have 
heeded the views of the Supreme Court on implied consent, 
“increasing judicial efficiency[,] and checking 
gamesmanship.”  Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948.  They have 
observed that the Supreme Court has highlighted “the 
consequences of ‘a litigant . . . ‘sandbagging’ the court—
remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the 
error only if the case does not conclude in his favor.’”  Stern, 
564 U.S. at 482 (alteration in original) (quoting Puckett v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009)); see also Wu, 552 
B.R. at 839 (stating a party may not belatedly raise an objection 
to jurisdiction after the bankruptcy court enters a final 
judgment against his claims).4  Thus courts have required 
claimants to raise the issue of consent before bankruptcy cases 
conclude, see Matter of Delta Produce, 845 F.3d at 617, and 
                                              
4 While the Supreme Court made this observation in the 
context of a bankruptcy court’s statutory authority to decide a 
claim, at least one district court has imported it into its analysis 
of the bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority to enter a 
final judgment on a claim.  See, e.g., Wu, 552 B.R. at 839.  
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have looked to litigants’ actions to determine if they have 
knowingly and voluntarily consented to jurisdiction, see, e.g., 
Mandel, 2016 WL 4943366, at *5; In re Pioneer Carriers, 
LLC, 583 B.R. 891, 898 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2018) (“[T]he 
[claimant] filed two separate and distinct proofs of claim . . . ; 
the Debtor filed the Objections . . . ; the [claimant] filed 
responses to the Objections . . . ; this Court held the [h]earing; 
and at no time did [either party] . . . ever object to this Court’s 
constitutional authority to enter a final order. . . .  If these 
circumstances do not constitute consent, nothing does.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
In line with this case law, we conclude that Younge 
impliedly consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction.  As 
noted, he filed a proof of claim, a response to Tribune’s 
objection, and a supplemental response.  In none of these 
filings did Younge question the Bankruptcy Court’s 
constitutional authority to decide his claims.  Instead, he 
indicated he assented to the Court’s entry of judgment in his 
favor.  See, e.g., Younge Suppl. Resp. at 2, Case No. 08-13141 
(KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 21, 2014), ECF No. 13951 (“Mr. 
Younge respectfully requests that this Court overrule the . . . 
[o]bjection.”).  He also made clear that he sought a final 
judgment on the merits, as his counsel presented additional 
evidence for the Court’s consideration and expressly stated that 
the evidence would allow the Court “to fully evaluate [his] 
claim,” including the issue of “liability.”  App. at 212a.  More 
than a year before issuing a final judgment, the Court notified 
him that briefing was complete and that it was “reviewing th[e] 
case.”  Id. at 59a (docket entry on September 8, 2014, stating 
“Judge Carey is reviewing th[e] case”).  Yet neither Younge 
nor his counsel raised any constitutional objection after that 
notice was filed.  In view of these actions, Younge knowingly 
and voluntarily submitted to the Bankruptcy Court’s deciding 
his claims.  Cf. In re Pioneer Carriers, 583 B.R. at 898.  
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Consequently, the Court had constitutional authority to enter a 
final judgment on them.5    
 Younge opposes this conclusion by portraying Wellness 
as intervening authority.  He claims he could not raise a 
constitutional objection during bankruptcy proceedings 
because the Supreme Court decided Wellness “after . . . 
bankruptcy court submissions were made.”  Younge Br. at 23.  
Again we disagree.  Although the Supreme Court decided 
Wellness after the parties completed briefing, Younge could 
have raised an objection with the Bankruptcy Court by filing a 
notice of supplemental authority.  See Bankr. D. Del. Local R. 
7007-1(b) (2015) (“No additional briefs, affidavits or other 
papers in support of or in opposition to the motion shall be filed 
without prior approval of the Court, except that a party may 
call to the Court’s attention and briefly discuss pertinent cases 
decided after a party’s final brief is filed or after oral 
argument.” (emphases added)).  He also could have asked the 
Court to reconsider its order disallowing his claim.  See Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 3008 (“A party in interest may move for 
reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim 
against the estate.”).  As such, Younge was not precluded from 
                                              
5 Though our discussion here somewhat mirrors our 
analysis of the Bankruptcy Court’s statutory authority, the 
touchstone of both inquiries is different.  A bankruptcy court 
has statutory authority to decide a personal injury tort claim if 
the party fails to raise an objection under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b)(5).  It has constitutional authority to enter a final 
judgment on the same type of claim if a litigant (1) fails to raise 
a constitutional objection and (2) knowingly and voluntarily 
assents to the court’s adjudication of his claims.  To repeat, a 
claimant’s actions may indicate his knowing and voluntary 
consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction.  See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 
1948. 
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raising a constitutional objection before the Bankruptcy Court, 
and we are not persuaded that he raised his concerns “at the 
first opportunity” by waiting until his appeal to the District 
Court.  Younge Br. at 24.   
Accordingly, we hold that the Bankruptcy Court had 
jurisdiction to decide Younge’s hostile work environment and 
wrongful termination claims.  As the District Court reached the 
same conclusion, we affirm this portion of its decision.    
B. The proceedings in Bankruptcy Court did not 
deprive Younge of his right to due process, 
right to a jury trial, or right to counsel.   
 Younge contends the Bankruptcy Court’s proceedings 
abridged his right to procedural due process, his right to a jury 
trial, and his right to counsel.  He brings his right-to-counsel 
argument under the Commerce Clause, claiming the 
Bankruptcy Court’s local-counsel requirement inures to the 
disadvantage of out-of-state litigants.  See Bankr. D. Del. Local 
R. 9010-1(d) (2015) (“A party not appearing pro se shall obtain 
representation by a member of the Bar of the District Court or 
have its counsel associate with a member of the Bar of the 
District Court. . . .”).  We address each contention in turn.  
 To start, “procedural due process requires ‘at a 
minimum . . . that deprivation of life, liberty or property by 
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case.’”  United States v. 
Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 322 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Mullane 
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).  
“[D]ue process considerations apply in the exercise of 
bankruptcy jurisdiction.”  In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc., 696 
F.2d 971, 976 (1st Cir. 1982).  During a bankruptcy 
proceeding, “both debtors and creditors have a constitutional 
right to be heard on their claims, and the denial of that right . . . 
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is the denial of due process. . . .”  Matter of Boomgarden, 780 
F.2d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 1985) (alteration omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).     
 Here Younge had notice of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
proceedings and had ample opportunities to be heard.  He filed 
a proof of claim and a pro se response.  When he obtained 
counsel, he had a hearing before the Bankruptcy Court, and it 
invited him to submit additional evidence and a supplemental 
response.  He gives us no indication that these procedures were 
constitutionally lacking.  Nor does he point to any additional 
procedures that were required to decide his claims.  As such, 
we cannot say that the Bankruptcy Court failed to afford him 
adequate due process.  Cf. In re Bartle, 560 F.3d 724, 730 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (“We cannot say that [the Debtor’s] substantial 
rights were affected by an erroneous deprivation of an 
opportunity to be heard . . . when he has not set forth what he 
would have brought to the court’s attention. . . .”); McNeil v. 
Drazin, 499 B.R. 484, 490 (D. Md. 2013) (“During both 
hearings . . . , [Appellant] presented evidence and legal 
arguments . . . before the Bankruptcy Court ruled against 
him. . . .  Thus, [Appellant] had an opportunity to be—and 
was—heard on this issue.” (footnote omitted) (internal 
citations omitted)).  
 Moving on to the Seventh Amendment claim, Younge 
argues he was entitled to a jury trial before the Bankruptcy 
Court disallowed his claims.  However, “there is no Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial for determination of objections 
to claims.”  Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337 (1966).  
Although the Bankruptcy Court viewed the claim objection as 
a motion for summary judgment, that also “does not violate a 
party’s Seventh Amendment jury trial rights so long as the 
person having the right to the jury trial is an actual participant 
in the summary judgment proceeding.”  In re TMI Litig., 193 
F.3d 613, 725 (3d Cir. 1999).  Here, as already noted, Younge 
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was an active participant in bankruptcy proceedings because 
he made several submissions to the Bankruptcy Court before it 
decided his claims.  Thus the Court did not violate his right to 
a jury trial by disallowing his claims. 
 Finally, Younge’s right-to-counsel argument is waived, 
as it was never raised before the District Court on appeal.  See 
DIRECTV Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“It is well established that arguments not raised before the 
District Court are waived on appeal.”).  In any event, the 
Bankruptcy Court’s local-counsel requirement does not apply 
to Younge, as the Local Rules allow litigants to “file or 
prosecute a proof of claim or a response to their claim” without 
obtaining local counsel.  Bankr. D. Del. Local R. 9010-1(e)(iii) 
(2015).  Although the Court “may . . . direct the claimant to 
consult with Delaware counsel if the claim litigation will 
involve extensive discovery or trial time,” Younge does not tell 
us that the Court asked him to find local counsel to help with 
discovery or a potential trial.  Accordingly, even if this 
contention were preserved for our review, we would not hold 
that Younge has stated a viable claim under the Commerce 
Clause.  
 In sum, the Court did not violate Younge’s 
constitutional rights, and its procedures were constitutionally 
sound.  There is no basis to disturb its decision based on the 
constitutional concerns Younge raises.  
C. We cannot transfer this case to the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania or remand it to the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Human 
Relations.  
In the alternative, Younge asks us to transfer this case 
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  He also requests that 
we remand his claims to the Pennsylvania Commission on 
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Human Relations and abstain in favor of proceedings before it.  
We cannot transfer or remand this case to another court 
because the claims have been discharged under § 524 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 524; see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1141(d)(1)(A) (“[T]he confirmation of a plan— . . . 
discharges the debtor from any debt [broadly defined as 
“liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12)] that arose before 
the date of such confirmation. . . .”).  Thus Younge cannot re-
litigate his claims in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Human Relations.    
D. The District Court and Bankruptcy Court 
correctly decided Younge’s hostile work 
environment claim, as Younge did not prove 
respondeat superior liability.  
Younge asserts the District Court incorrectly decided 
his hostile work environment claim.  Before addressing the 
merits of its decision, he raises two procedural arguments.  
First, he contends the District Court erred in reviewing the 
Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings for clear error because the 
latter had no statutory or constitutional authority to hear his 
claims.  As noted, however, Younge did not raise any statutory 
or constitutional objections during bankruptcy proceedings.  
He also knowingly and voluntarily consented to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction.  Thus the District Court 
applied the correct standard of review to the Bankruptcy 
Court’s findings of fact.  See In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 
645 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (noting a district 
court reviews a bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear 
error and legal conclusions de novo).  
Next, he argues the Bankruptcy Court and District Court 
misapplied the summary-judgment standard and failed to give 
his submissions “proper weight.”  Younge Br. at 35.  But the 
record demonstrates that both Courts considered Younge’s 
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evidence at face value and drew all inferences in his favor.  
They were not required to do anything more, and Younge does 
not point us to any evidence that they disregarded or 
downplayed.  As such, we discern no error in the Bankruptcy 
Court’s and District Court’s application of the summary 
judgment standard.   
Turning to the merits, Younge argues his hostile work 
environment claim survives summary judgment because he 
was subjected to severe or pervasive discrimination.  He 
further contends WPHL had respondeat superior liability, as it 
had actual or constructive knowledge of Schultz’s racial 
hostility.   
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”), it is unlawful for “an employer . . . to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment . . . because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .”6  
                                              
6 Younge also brings his hostile work environment 
claim under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.  In 
pertinent part, it provides: 
 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice 
. . . [f]or any employer because of the race, color, 
religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national 
origin or non-job related handicap or disability 
or the use of a guide or support animal because 
of the blindness, deafness or physical handicap 
of any individual or independent contractor, to 
refuse to hire or employ or contract with, or to 
bar or to discharge from employment such 
individual or independent contractor, or to 
otherwise discriminate against such individual or 
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  The Supreme Court has observed 
that Title VII “is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ 
discrimination,” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 64 (1986), and that it also bars “a discriminatorily hostile 
or abusive [work] environment,” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).   
“[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ [is] 
. . . determined only by looking at all the circumstances[,] . . . 
includ[ing] the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or 
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”  Id. at 23.  
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff 
must show “1) the employee suffered intentional 
discrimination because of his/her [race], 2) the discrimination 
was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally 
affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally 
affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the 
existence of respondeat superior liability. . . .”  Castleberry v. 
STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (alterations 
                                              
independent contractor with respect to 
compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment or contract, if the 
individual or independent contractor is the best 
able and most competent to perform the services 
required. 
 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(a).  Because its language is 
“substantially similar” to Title VII, we interpret both statutes 
identically and do not undertake a separate analysis of 
Younge’s state-law claim.  Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 
F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002).   
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omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mandel 
v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)).   
Because the District Court’s opinion “hinged on” the 
final element—“the absence of respondeat superior 
liability”—we focus our analysis on that element of Younge’s 
claim.  In re Tribune Media Co., 2017 WL 2622743, at *8.  To 
start, employers may be liable for either a supervisor’s or a co-
worker’s discriminatory acts.  Employers are strictly liable for 
a supervisor’s actions “[i]f the supervisor’s harassment 
culminates in a tangible employment action.”  Vance v. Ball 
State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).  The Supreme Court has 
defined a “tangible employment action” as “a significant 
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassign[ing] with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits.”  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 
(1998).   
 However, “[w]hen the hostile work environment is 
created by . . . non-supervisory coworkers,” employers are “not 
automatically liable” in all instances.  Huston v. Procter & 
Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009).  
“Rather, employer liability . . . exists only if [(1)] the 
employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint 
or . . . [(2)] the employer knew or should have known of the 
harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial 
action.”  Id.  
Younge relies on both theories of respondeat superior 
liability for his hostile work environment claim.  He contends 
WPHL is strictly liable for Schultz’s actions because it made a 
tangible employment decision to assign him to train with 
Schultz.  In his view, the station knew of Schultz’s racial bias 
because Schultz asked Leff, “[W]hy are you training a hoop 
. . . who doesn’t know anything?”  App. at 159a (internal 
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quotation marks omitted).  Younge claims that Schultz made 
this statement before the altercation and that Leff relayed 
Schultz’s comments on to Hort (as noted, a supervisor) before 
he trained with Schultz.   
 As a preliminary matter, this contention is waived, as 
Younge never presented it to the Bankruptcy Court.  See 
Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(agreeing with the district court that an issue is waived when a 
party does not raise it in bankruptcy court).  However, even if 
we consider it on the merits, WPHL’s assignments during 
employee training were not a tangible employment action, as 
they did not effect “a significant change in [Younge’s] 
employment status.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.  Thus Younge 
cannot prove that WPHL is strictly liable under the first theory 
of respondeat superior liability.  He may only succeed on his 
claim if he demonstrates that the station was liable for co-
worker harassment.  See Huston, 568 F.3d at 104 (describing 
the prerequisites for employer liability for a co-worker’s 
discriminatory actions). 
 Turning to this point, Younge argues WPHL knew or 
should have known of Schultz’s alleged racial bias.  He points 
out that Hort and Elias told him, “[W]e have had problems with 
S[c]hultz before.”  App. at 74a (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  He also asserts that Kerr and Leff were aware that 
Schultz “ha[d] a problem” and could cause “trouble.”  In re 
Tribune Media Co., 2016 WL 1122865, at *2 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Finally, he tells us Schultz’s 
personnel file includes an incident from 1993 involving 
racially charged remarks.  
 While some of these allegations are troubling, they are 
still not enough to establish that WPHL knew or should have 
known of Schultz’s racial animus.  For example, the statements 
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made by Hort, Elias, Kerr, and Leff plainly indicate that 
Schultz had a “problem,” but none of them specify that he 
exhibited racial animosity toward his colleagues.  Although the 
incident from 1993 gives us pause, it involved disputed 
accusations of racial bias and occurred 15 years before 
Younge’s altercation with Schultz.  There are no similar 
incidents in Schultz’s personnel file that occurred after the 
1993 incident.  In view of this evidence, we cannot conclude 
that the station had actual or constructive knowledge of 
Schultz’s alleged racial animus at the time of the altercation.7  
 Younge counters that WPHL must have known of 
Schultz’s racial bias, as the latter told the Pennsylvania 
Commission on Human Relations that his nickname was “the 
Nazi.”  This statement is undoubtedly disturbing.  But the law 
does not tell us to look at Schultz’s comments in isolation.  
Rather, it directs our attention to what WPHL knew or should 
have known about his conduct while he was employed there.  
See Huston, 568 F.3d at 104.  As such, we may not consider 
his remarks to the Commission to determine what the station 
knew (or should have known) when he was its employee.  Nor 
can we make this type of inference based on the record, as 
                                              
7 Recall that an employer may also be liable for a co-
worker’s discriminatory acts “if . . . [it] failed to provide a 
reasonable avenue for complaint.”  Huston, 568 F.3d at 104.  
Younge does not argue that WPHL failed to provide a 
reasonable way to assert a complaint.  In any event, we cannot 
impute liability to the station on this basis because the record 
demonstrates that Younge had an opportunity to complain 
about Schultz’s behavior and that the station took those 
complaints seriously, launching an internal investigation and 
terminating Schultz after the investigation concluded.  
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Schultz never mentioned whether WPHL’s management knew 
of his nickname during his tenure there.   
 Finally, Younge points to Schultz’s interview with 
WPHL’s Human Resources Department after the incident.  He 
asserts this interview gave the station adequate knowledge that 
Schultz exhibited racial bias, as Schultz admitted he used the 
terms “Spike Lee” and “hoop” in reference to Younge.  App. 
at 159a-60a.  Even if this were true, WPHL discharged Schultz 
immediately after the interview, taking “prompt and 
appropriate remedial action” once it learned of his comments.  
Huston, 568 F.3d at 104 (noting an employer is liable for co-
worker harassment if “[it] knew or should have known of the 
harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial 
action”).  Thus Schultz’s statements during his interview are 
not enough to sustain Younge’s hostile work environment 
claim.  
 In sum, nothing in the record allows us to conclude that 
WPHL had respondeat superior liability for Schultz’s conduct.  
Although we agree that certain portions of the record are 
troubling, they do not touch on WPHL’s knowledge of 
Schultz’s racial animus—a key facet of Younge’s hostile work 
environment claim.  Accordingly, we affirm the District 
Court’s holding on this claim.  
E. The District Court correctly decided 
Younge’s wrongful termination claim because 
WPHL offered a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for his termination and 
Younge failed to demonstrate pretext.  
Younge contends the District Court incorrectly decided 
his wrongful termination claim.  He insists WPHL’s reasons 
for discharging him were pretextual and that the station 
terminated his employment because of his race and/or color. 
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Tribune counters that it provided a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for ending Younge’s employment.  It 
asserts Younge cannot demonstrate pretext in this context, as 
he received the same treatment as Schultz.  
Title VII prohibits employers from “discharg[ing] any 
individual . . . because of [his] . . . race.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1).  As noted, we analyze wrongful termination claims by 
using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, see 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, which gives a 
plaintiff “the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination,” id. at 802.  Once he has done so, 
“the burden . . . shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of a 
legitimate, non[-]discriminatory reason for the [adverse 
employment] action.”  Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 
F.3d 971, 974 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998).  After a defendant provides 
this type of evidence, “the burden . . . rebounds to the plaintiff, 
who must . . . show . . . that the employer’s explanation is 
pretextual.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 
1994).   
We start with the first step of the framework.  To 
establish a prima facie case, Younge must prove “that he (1) 
was a member of a protected class . . . , (2) was qualified for 
the position at issue, (3) suffered an adverse employment 
action[,] and (4) was ultimately replaced” under circumstances 
that support an inference of unlawful discrimination.  Connors, 
160 F.3d at 973-74.  He no doubt meets the first three elements, 
as he (1) is an African-American man who (2) has years of 
experience in the industry and (3) was discharged from his 
position.  The parties, however, dispute whether he can 
establish the final element of a prima facie case.  The 
Bankruptcy Court and District Court also took different paths 
as to the last element.  Compare In re Tribune Media Co., 2016 
WL 1122865, at *8 (Bankruptcy Court stating Younge cannot 
satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie case), with In re 
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Tribune Media Co., 2017 WL 2622743, at *10 (District Court 
stating it “assumes, without analyzing, that Younge meets 
the prima facie case”).  
For our purposes, we adopt the same position as the 
District Court and assume, without deciding, that Younge has 
proven a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  As such, 
we move on to the second step of the framework and evaluate 
whether WPHL has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for his termination.  If it cannot satisfy this burden, 
Younge is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.  See 
Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 
1997) (en banc).  However, if the station meets its burden, we 
continue our analysis to the final step of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework.  See id.   
Here WPHL supplied a legitimate and non-
discriminatory reason for Younge’s termination because it 
stated that he was fired for violating the station’s Code of 
Conduct and Anti-Harassment Policy.  WPHL’s 
representatives also told the Pennsylvania Commission on 
Human Relations that Younge “was discharged because he 
violated the [s]tation’s policies against fighting.”  App. at 139a.  
This is enough to satisfy the employer’s “relatively light 
burden” under the McDonnell Douglas framework.  Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 763; see also Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 185 
(3d Cir. 2005) (noting an employee’s repeated failure “to 
submit proper leave forms” and “unwilling[ness] to work 
necessary overtime hours” may be legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for termination).  Accordingly, Younge 
is not entitled to summary judgment on his wrongful 
termination claim, and we must proceed to the last step of the 
framework. 
To repeat for convenience, the final step of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to prove 
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that the employer’s reasons for his termination were pretextual.  
He may do so by “point[ing] to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either 
(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons . . . 
or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more 
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
employer’s action.”  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  If he succeeds in 
meeting this burden, he has defeated summary judgment on his 
wrongful termination claim.  See id.  If he falls short, however, 
the employer is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.  See 
id.  
  In this case, Younge has not carried his burden under 
the first prong.  Far from giving us evidence from which we 
could “disbelieve the [station’s] articulated . . . reasons” for 
terminating his employment, id., he admitted he cursed at 
Schultz during the altercation, see App. at 161a, engaging in 
conduct that was barred by WPHL’s policies.  Thus the record 
does not give us sufficient basis to discredit WPHL’s 
explanation for its employment decision.  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d 
at 765 (observing that a plaintiff may prevail on the first prong 
if he “present[s] sufficient evidence to . . . throw into question, 
i.e., to cast substantial doubt upon, [an employer’s] . . . 
reasons”).  Instead, it lends credibility to the station’s rationale 
and forces Younge to rely on the second prong to demonstrate 
pretext and survive summary judgment.  
 Turning to this part of the analysis, Younge argues that 
a discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating 
cause for the station’s actions because it treated Schultz more 
favorably after altercations in 1993 and 2002.  See id. (noting 
that a plaintiff may prove pretext under the second prong if “the 
employer treated other . . . similarly situated persons not of his 
protected class more favorably”).  He contends Schultz 
remained employed at the station after both incidents and 
received only a written warning for the altercation in 2002 even 
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though it also involved profanity.  Because the incident in 2008 
was Younge’s first altercation, he claims the station disciplined 
him more harshly for the same type of conduct.      
 Although Younge correctly notes that Schultz was 
disciplined more leniently for his previous altercations, that is 
not enough to show that WPHL’s reasons for Younge’s 
termination were pretextual.  Instead, he must show that 
Schultz was “similarly[]situated in all respects”—in other 
words, he “dealt with the same supervisor, . . . [was] subject to 
the same standards[,] and . . . engaged in the same conduct” 
during his earlier altercations.  Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 
F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).  Younge has not done so here, 
as he has not told us whether the station had the same 
employment policies in 1993 or 2002 or whether Schultz’s 
earlier altercations involved the same degree of yelling, 
profanity, and disruption.  See E.E.O.C. v. Kohler Co., 335 
F.3d 766, 776 (8th Cir. 2003) (“To be probative evidence of 
pretext, the misconduct of more leniently disciplined 
employees must be of ‘comparable seriousness.’” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U.S. at 804)).  Hence we cannot conclude that Schultz’s 
previous altercations are comparable to the altercation between 
Younge and Schultz in 2008.   
 Younge also contends that the station treated Schultz 
more favorably after this altercation because the latter received 
a severance while Younge “was tossed out on[]to the street.”  
Younge Br. at 33.  But again, Younge and Schultz were not 
similarly situated in this context.  See Patterson v. Avery 
Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (“To meet 
her burden of demonstrating that another employee is 
‘similarly situated,’ a plaintiff must show that there is someone 
who is directly comparable to her in all material respects.”).  
While Younge was a seasonal, non-union employee, Schultz 
was a full-time, union employee who had been with WPHL 
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since 1972.  Accordingly, their tenure and status at the station 
are not comparable, and the station’s failure to give Younge a 
severance does not indicate its reasons for discharging him 
were pretextual. 
 It follows that Younge cannot demonstrate that WPHL 
terminated his employment out of discriminatory hostility.  
There is no comparator that suggests WPHL’s decision was 
guided by racial bias or some other “illegitimate factor.”  
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.  Instead, as the Bankruptcy Court aptly 
observed, “the best comparator for Younge’s firing is the 
[s]tation’s treatment of Schultz, who participated in the same 
incident and was investigated at the same time by the same 
people.  It is undisputed that [Younge and Schultz] received 
the same treatment,” as both were terminated for violating the 
Code of Conduct and Anti-Harassment Policy.  In re Tribune 
Media Co., 2016 WL 1122865, at *11.   
Hence Younge cannot show that WPHL’s reason for 
firing him was pretextual.  As the Bankruptcy Court and 
District Court reached the same conclusion, we concur with 
their decision on this claim.     
IV. Conclusion 
 Younge challenges the Bankruptcy Court’s statutory 
and constitutional authority to decide his employment 
discrimination claims and asks if he can recover for an incident 
of racial harassment by Schultz, a co-worker at WPHL.  We 
lack any basis to question the Court’s authority at this stage, as 
Younge never objected to it during bankruptcy proceedings 
and instead knowingly and voluntarily submitted to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.   
 When we turn to the merits, we also see no reason to 
disturb the District Court’s decision affirming that of the 
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Bankruptcy Court.  Although Schultz exhibited racial 
animosity toward Younge, we cannot impute liability to 
WPHL for a hostile work environment claim because we have 
no evidence that it had knowledge of Schultz’s racial bias at 
the time of the incident.  Similarly, we cannot say that Younge 
was wrongfully terminated because WPHL provided a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his discharge.  More 
importantly, its rationale was not pretextual because Younge 
and Schultz were both fired for engaging in the same conduct.  
Younge gives us no examples of similarly situated individuals 
who were disciplined more leniently for the same type of 
conduct.  Without this type of evidence, we cannot rule in his 
favor.  Thus we affirm.    
